English Translation of
Chashukei Chemed, Tractate Chullin, Page 32a
Question: Is it desirable to reveal the reason behind Torah commandments (ta’ama dekra)?
Answer: It is stated in Sanhedrin (21b): Rabbi Yitzchak said: Why were the reasons for the Torah’s commandments not revealed? Because in two instances where their reasons were revealed, a great man of the world stumbled. It is written: “He shall not multiply wives for himself [lest his heart turn away]” (Deuteronomy 17:17). Shlomo (Solomon) said, “I will multiply wives, yet I will not turn away,” but it is written: “And it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart” (I Kings 11:4). It is also written: “He shall not multiply horses for himself [lest he return the people to Egypt]” (Deuteronomy 17:16). Shlomo said, “I will multiply horses, yet I will not return them,” but it is written: “And a chariot came up and went out of Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver…” (I Kings 10:29). See there. This implies that it is inappropriate to reveal the reason for a scripture, as doing so can lead to a stumbling block.
On the other hand, the Gemara expounds in Pesachim (118b -119a) that in the future those that dwell before Hashem will merit to obtain the things that the Ancient of Days concealed. And what are they? The reasons of the Torah. Thus implying finding reasons for the commandments is something to be valued (note this paragraph for the sake of simplicity was given as a summary and not as a literal translation).
Thus, there appears to be a great virtue in revealing the reasons of the Torah.
See the Maharsha there, who wrote to reconcile this: Specifically, regarding a matter whose reason the Torah itself revealed, it leads to a stumbling block. However, regarding a matter whose reason is hidden in the Torah—even if the Sages offer a reason for it—it will not lead to a stumbling block. See there for his reconciliation.
In the book Margaliot HaYam on Sanhedrin (there), he explained the Maharsha’s intent: When the Torah itself explicitly writes the reason, a person might think that if the reason does not apply to them, the law is void. Conversely, when the reason is not written in the Torah, but the Sages provided a reason, people will not stumble from it—for would we perform an act based merely on our own logical comparisons?! Are not Hashem’s thoughts profoundly deep? See there, where he brings numerous examples from throughout the Talmud and the Rishonim showing that the Sages expounded the reasons behind scriptural commands.
See further what the Sefer HaChinuch wrote (Mitzvah 159), quoted as follows:
“Among the roots of this commandment (the impurity of creeping creatures), no person of intellect should doubt that there has never been a human being who attained the entirety of all wisdom to its end without missing a detail. For even regarding Moshe our Teacher, peace be upon him, the Sages of blessed memory said that fifty gates of understanding were created, and all were given to Moshe except one… Therefore, when we comprehend through our wisdom any benefit accrued to us from the commandments, we should rejoice in it. But when our wisdom fails to comprehend their benefit to us, we must nevertheless consider that due to the ultimate wisdom of Hashem above all creatures, He knew the benefit we derive from that commandment, and therefore commanded us concerning it.
And the Sages of blessed memory have already informed us why the reason for all commandments was not made known: so that it would not become a stumbling block for us. They brought proof that when the reason for three of them was revealed, a great man of the world stumbled in them.
Let no opponent come against me… regarding what I have now said—that Hashem concealed from us the reasons for the commandments, yet I have raised my hand to speak about them to my young students. For my teachers preceded me in discussing many aspects of them in Midrashim and elsewhere according to their literal sense (peshat). The depth of their wisdom, the strength of their insight, and their immense holiness remain hidden within them, unmoved even by all the winds of the world. Whoever delves deeply into their plain meaning and strives to innovate regarding their revealed layer—longing to peer through the lattice, delight in the splendor of their appearance, and gather from them to gird themselves—it is improper to lay guilt upon him. Rather, one should bless him and mention him favorably wherever he is…” See there.
Thus, the Chinuch explicitly stated that his purpose in writing the reasons for the commandments was not for deriving practical halachic rulings, but rather to demonstrate the wisdom of the Torah.
See also the lengthier discussion by Rabbi Hillel of Verona in Tagmulei HaNefesh (a student of Rabbeinu Yonah), where he wrote:
“…But to offer a fitting and proper reason for the commandments—meaning that the Blessed Holy One commanded a specific precept for a specific reason—and to state it in order to glorify the commandments so they do not seem like empty matters: this task is heavenly work, honoring the Creator and honoring Israel.” See there.
Now, it is stated in Chullin (32a): If a knife fell and he picked it up, or his clothes fell and he picked them up, or he sharpened the knife and was exhausted, and his companion came and slaughtered—if he paused (shehiyah) for the duration of a slaughtering, it is invalid.
The Prisha (Yoreh De’ah 23:3) writes two reasons why pausing (shehiyah) invalidates slaughtering:
- It is derived from the Torah’s word “v’shachat” (and he shall slaughter), implying one continuous slaughter rather than two separate slaughters.
- When the slaughterer pauses in the middle of the act, the animal recoils out of fright (bi’atuta) from the slaughtering. Consequently, the blood becomes absorbed into its organs and cannot be removed through salting.
On the other hand, the Simlah Chadashah (there, §1) wrote in the name of the Razah that all five invalidating factors of slaughtering—including pausing (shehiyah)—are royal decrees (gezeirat melech) and oral traditions given to Moshe at Sinai (Halachah le-Moshe mi-Sinai), and one must not ask for reasons behind these laws.
The Tevuot Shor (there, §1) added that relying on the aforementioned reasons could lead to severe halachic errors. For example, people might come to permit the meat by salting or roasting it—just as in the case where an animal’s neck bone is broken, where eating its meat raw is forbidden because its blood recedes and becomes re-absorbed in the organs, yet it remains permitted via salting or roasting. Furthermore, people might err and argue that if the entire reason for the prohibition is due to blood, one should permit the inner intestines, which do not hold blood. Therefore, we have no permission to question or rationalize the reason for the invalidation of shehiyah.
The Pri Megadim (Siftei Da’at there, §2) wrote that another error could arise from this reason: If the prohibition of shehiyah were due to blood rather than the status of a non-kosher carcass (neveilah), then if an olive’s bulk (kezayit) of neveilah and an olive’s bulk of meat slaughtered with shehiyah were mixed with sixty times as much valid meat (59 kezayitim of kosher meat), the entire mixture would become permitted. This is because we hold the rule that distinct prohibitions nullify one another; thus, the kezayit of neveilah would be nullified in sixty kezayitim that are not neveilah, and the kezayit of shehiyah would be nullified in sixty kezayitim free of blood.
He wrote another practical difference (nafkamina) based on this reason: If the prohibition of shehiyah is only due to blood, once the meat is cooked, it would only be prohibited by Rabbinic law (since cooked blood is only forbidden rabbinically). People might then treat a case of uncertainty leniently, following the rule that uncertainties in Rabbinic law are resolved leniently (safek d’rabbanan l’kula).
He also questioned the first reason mentioned above—that “v’shachat” implies one slaughter rather than two—pointing out that all laws of slaughtering are Halachah le-Moshe mi-Sinai and are not explicitly detailed in the text, except for pressing (derasah).
See further in Pri Megadim (in his introduction to the Laws of Shechitah), where he wrote:
“The reason for this commandment (of slaughtering) was brought by the Eliyah Rabbah in the name of Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 451): that most of the blood exits from the neck so that the blood drains out, and additionally to prevent animal cruelty (tza’ar ba’alei chayim). From this he proves that preventing cruelty to animals is a biblical obligation… Similarly, using a notched knife is forbidden due to animal cruelty, see there.
However, all authorities have already written that one should not assign a reason to any commandment—including the five laws of slaughtering. Even though reasons for them are found in a few books, one should pay no heed to them, and I will explain each one in its place with Hashem’s help.” End of quote.
Thus, the Pri Megadim wrote that it is improper to write the reasons for the commandments of slaughtering, their specific details, or any commandment at all. On the contrary, writing reasons for commandments can lead to stumbling blocks.
However, as stated earlier, there is no inherent prohibition against providing a reason for commandments; rather, doing so honors Heaven.
I heard a similar concept from my teacher, the Rosh Yeshiva of Slobodka, the Gaon and Tzaddik Rabbi Eisik Sher zt”l, that there are two distinct meanings of “reason” (ta’am):
- A reason that serves as the cause/mechanism behind the law.
- A reason in the sense of “Taste (ta’amu) and see that Hashem is good” (Psalms 34:9)—meaning it is not the underlying cause of the law, but serves to sweeten and draw the learner’s heart, showing how pleasant the Torah and commandments are.
Our teacher, the Chinuch, intended to write reasons to demonstrate the good taste and sweetness of the Torah’s commandments, as he wrote in his introduction: “Out of my intense desire to dip the tip of the staff into the honeycomb of commandments, I pressed forward into a boundless forest.” In light of this, my teacher zt”l added that the reasons provided by the Chinuch are not causes or origins of the laws from which one can derive practical legal conclusions (nafkamina), but are solely intended to add flavor and showcase the sweetness of the Torah.
It is possible that the later authorities (Acharonim) mentioned above raised their objections because they witnessed practical stumbling blocks occurring as a result. This is similar to what I heard in the name of Maran Rabbi Y.T.H. Donner zt”l: About 150 years ago, a professor discovered that pork contains a dangerous parasite. Some Jews remarked that the reason for the prohibition was now understood, celebrating it as a great sanctification of Hashem’s name (Kiddush Hashem) showing that the Torah knew pork was dangerous to eat.
Fifty years later, a Jewish doctor discovered a medicine that neutralized the parasite. He then added that since the sole reason pork was forbidden was because of the parasite, now that the parasite was neutralized, eating pork should be permitted (may such words be forgiven)!
This demonstrates that great caution is required when explaining the reasons for commandments. It must be made crystal clear that these explanations are not the underlying cause of the commandment, so that people do not stumble into nullifying the law when the reason appears to be absent.
Furthermore, it should be noted that there may indeed be a practical legal outcome (nafkamina le-dina) derived from the Chinuch‘s explanation that the reason for slaughtering is to prevent animal cruelty (tza’ar ba’alei chayim). As we wrote in Chashukei Chemed on Tractate Zevachim (64b): If a non-Jew wishes to learn the laws of slaughtering, there is room to teach him on the grounds of preventing animal cruelty.
A Bull and a Donkey Suffering from Hunger: If They Work Together, They Will Receive Food
Question: It is stated in the Chinuch (Mitzvah 550): Not to plow with a bull and a donkey together. The same applies to any two species of animals where one is kosher (tehorah) and the other is non-kosher (tmeiah). The prohibition is not limited to plowing alone, but applies to any work, such as threshing or pulling a wagon. Concerning this it is said: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10).
Among the reasons for this commandment is the issue of animal cruelty (tza’ar ba’alei chayim), which is biblically prohibited. It is well known that species of animals and birds experience great distress when dwelling with species other than their own, and all the more so when working with them. As we see with our own eyes among wild creatures, every bird dwells with its own kind, and all animals likewise cleave to their own kind.
Every wise-hearted person should take moral instruction from this: never to appoint two people together for any task if they are distant in nature and different in conduct—such as a righteous person and a wicked person, or a lowly person and an honored person. For if the Torah was sensitive to the distress caused to mindless animals, how much more so regarding human beings, who possess an intelligent soul to know their Creator! End of his words.
The question arises: What is the law if a bull and a donkey have no food and are suffering from hunger, but if they plow together, the owner of the field [a non-Jew] will feed them? Is it permissible in such a case to plow with them together? Since one of the reasons for the commandment is to prevent their distress, and here their suffering from hunger is greater, perhaps it is preferable that they work together and receive food rather than suffer from hunger without plowing?
Answer: It appears that this is forbidden. The life-saving imperative (pikuach nefesh) of an animal is not like the life-saving imperative of a human being, regarding whom it is said: “and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5)—and not die by them.
As for what the Chinuch wrote—that the reason for the scripture is due to animal cruelty—we have already elaborated above that the Chinuch himself wrote that one must not derive lenient halachic rulings from these reasons. This is especially true for this commandment, where the Chinuch emphasized that this is merely one of the reasons for the commandment, and the reason is expounded to add moral insight—as he wrote, never to appoint two people together who are distant in nature and different in conduct.
Rabbi Zilberstein’s words in Chashukei Chemed, quoted above I have brought for a specific purpose.
As I see more religious figures bringing dubious leniencies to justify voting for religious parties that seek to put Non-Jewish, seemingly “pro-Zionist” non-Jews into Israel’s legislature and to serve as cabinet ministers, my hope is to find a new line of reasoning to change their minds. My hope is that an appeal to some of the reasons given by the rabbis for not appointing a non-Jew or even a righteous convert to Judaism to positions of dominion over Jews born to a Jewish mother, might convince the waverers on this issue.
I realize though that quoting “reasons for commandments” is a double-edged sword, where the unscrupulous might try to use a reason for the commandment as a means of uprooting the commandment by saying nowadays the reason does not apply. My hope is that after reading Rabbi Zilberstein’s essay you will understand that this is not my purpose in bringing the Sefer HaChinuch’s reason for Commandment #498
Sefer HaChinuch Commandment #498
Mitzvah 498
To not establish a foreign king over us: That we were prevented from establishing a man that is not from the seed of Israel — and even if he is a righteous convert — [as] king upon us. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 17:15), “You may not place upon yourself a foreign man that is not your brother.” And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifrei Devarim 157, “‘You may not place upon yourself a foreign man’ — this is a negative commandment.” And likewise, it is not fitting to appoint upon us for anything — not a Torah appointment and not a state appointment — a man that is from the “congregation of converts,” until his mother be from Israel, from that which is written, “You shall surely place, etc.”; and they, may their memory be blessed, made a precise inference (Kiddushin 76b), “Any placing that you do shall only be from among your brothers.”
The roots of the commandment are well-known: Since it is for the appointed head to humble all in everything that he says, it is necessary that he nonetheless be from the seed of Israel — as they are merciful, the children of merciful ones — so that he will have mercy on the people not to make their yoke heavy in any matter from all of the things. And he should love truth, justice and righteousness — as it is known to all that anyone who is from the family of Avraham has all of these good [qualities]; and similar to what the wise men of science said, that the nature of the father is planted in his children.
From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Kiddushin 76b) that we only set up a head of authority from the seed of Israel — and even if he is appointed over a watercourse to distribute from it to the fields {end of translated quote}.
Another Possible Reason Based on the Rabbi Akiva Precedent
In tractate Brachot 27b when the sages decided to depose Rabban Gamliel from being the head of the Sanhedrin (due to his mistreatment of Rabbi Yehoshua) they were looking for a replacement. The Talmud explains, they did not choose Rabbi Akiva because he lacked the merit of his forefathers. The Chevruta commentary explains that he lacked the merit of the forefathers that would protect him from punishment because he was from the seed of converts [based on Tractate Sanhedrin 96a].
According to the Talmud Kiddushin 76b Both Gentiles and Converts Were Excluded from the Army of the House of David Because They Lacked Merit of Their Forefathers
Here is the translation of the passage according to Sefaria.org
The mishna teaches that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Even the descendants of one who was written in the army list of the Jewish king does not have their lineage investigated. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The reference is to one who was written in the list of the military troops of the House of David, who were all of pure lineage. Rav Yosef said: What is the verse from which it is derived? The phrase is: “Reckoned by lineage for service in war” (I Chronicles 7:40). The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for this requirement that they be of unflawed lineage? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is in order that their merit and the merit of their ancestors will help them in battle.
What About Ittay the Gittite?
The politician Ofer Winter used the precedent of King David’s General Ittay the Gittite to dispute the Halacha on the issue of having a gentile run for Israel’s Knesset. I hope Hashem willing and without vowing, to put out a rebuttal in a separate article.
Conclusion
I have offered the Minchat Chinuch’s reason for the mitzva and a second possible reason. It you don’t like either reason go out and find yourself another reason. The Halacha stands on its own with or without human justifications for the will of Hashem.
Article by Shlomo Moshe Scheinman
Further suggested reading: Are the Commandments of Judaism, Demands , I Would Expect from an Omnipotent Creator?